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Abstract: It is well acknowledged that there is not one but many Marxes, and one area 
where this has been most evident is in the question of technological and economic determin-
ism. This article traces some key moments in this debate and attempts to locate their most 
recent iteration in disagreements over the place of the human brain in both historical agency 
and value creation in so called ‘cognitive’ or ‘post-Fordist’ capitalism. Of significant interest in 
the current configuration – or rather composition – of capital is the place of the digitisation of 
the labour process and its relation to, and integration with, human cognition and volition. Ar-
guments over the attention economy and the power of post-Fordist capitalism to distract and 
direct is a significant variation of the question of ideology and the latest variation of the 
base/superstructure debate. This article will unpack the aforesaid issues to offer an articulat-
ed perspective in order to make the argument that taking a balanced view of determination 
will allow us to acknowledge that – drawing on the argument of determination in the last in-
stance – we can hold both of these ‘Marxes’ to be simultaneously valid. Here, a revisiting of 
Marx’s concept of General Intellect will be undertaken, wherein the productive capacity of 
living labour is employed in both active agency and the capture of value, in which the plastici-
ty of the living brain becomes the pivot point for both exploitation by, and resistance to, capi-
tal.  
Keywords: brain, consciousness, digital labour, intention, autonomous Marxism, base, su-
perstructure, determinism, plasticity 
1. Introduction  
We live in a time of climate catastrophe, infrastructure collapse, appalling social dep-
rivation and hardship. Generations born in even the most prosperous countries have 
little hope of reaching the same standard of life as their parents. Yet never in history 
has there been such wealth, such astonishing accumulations of money, goods and 
opportunity. The technological wonders of the 21st century render the needs of phys-
ical labour and want an unnecessary burden, yet still the misery, the soul-destroying 
brutality of this world, expands without seeming limit. Mechanisation and digitalisation 
of the economy, instead of liberating the time of workers towards the cultivation of 
free expression and self-development, has merely shifted the contradictions of capi-
talism onto the terrain of the human brain. As such the brain can now be regarded as 
the key organ of capitalist production. The aim here is thus to survey some of the 
perspectives that inform this shift and to open up a space for further reflection, and in 
particular to explore how this pertains to questions of determinism and the relation of 
base to superstructure.  
Much of this trajectory is entirely explicable within the writing of Karl Marx as the 
unfolding of the logic of capitalism. Yet one question remains stubbornly unanswered 
– why does capitalism persist? In the 200 years since the birth of Karl Marx such 
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questions have been raised and debated repeatedly. The fact that we still turn to 
Marx for answers is testament to the enduring power of his ideas.  
It is well recognised that there are many Marxes, and a multitude of Marxisms, so 
we need to ask: which Marx should we be turn to? Étienne Balibar (2017, 4) tells us 
that, “Marx was not led by his theoretical activity towards a unified system, but to an 
at least potential plurality of doctrines which has left his readers and successors in 
something of a quandary”. However, Balibar also sees this as a distinct advantage, 
which springs from the openness of Marx’s method. One area of ambiguity, and one 
that is of direct relevance here, is the alleged ‘break’. The ‘break’ occurred some-
where between The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and The Ger-
man Ideology. Louis Althusser (2017, 4), the leading proponent of such, placed this 
in 1845. The break is alleged between a humanistic Marx – still influenced by the 
idealism of Hegel and attached to a view of the human as torn between an authentic 
self-determined species-being and the alienation of labour – and the post-break 
Marx, who was committed to understanding the human in the context of the scientific 
unfolding of history and the internal contradictory economistic logic of capital.  
 This matters because it concerns the question of where to place the human be-
ing, and the human brain, in the chain of determination. The answer leads to very 
different proposals as to what we are to do in order to bring about change. In the 
crudest terms: do we marshal our collective intelligence to force change, or do we 
stand by at the ready to let capital destroy itself and harness the inevitable unfolding 
of communism?  
Balibar agrees that there is undoubtedly such a break, but that there is more than 
one such break, and these breaks are as much to do with adaptations to historical 
shifts and events as a complete abandonment of early naive positions. For example, 
the failure of the revolutions of 1848 was just as significant as 1845 (Balibar 2017, 9). 
Thus, the case can be made for Marx as a reactive and flexible thinker whose ideas 
can and should be reviewed and reapplied to different historical moments, and as 
such his continuing value is in this flexibility.  
It is perhaps then helpful to offer a clarification here, a simplistic but useful distinc-
tion between four orientations to Marx: firstly, an orthodox rigidly deterministic read-
ing rooted only in the economic writings; secondly, a recognition of the humanistic 
early Marx but the positing of a clear break, with a commitment to the ‘mature’ post-
break Marx, in which a purely ‘scientific socialism’ is maintained; thirdly, a downplay-
ing of the break, in which the humanism of the early Marx is present throughout his 
later works; finally an orientation that recognises the fundamental importance of the 
economic, but which recognises the multiplicity of Marxes and that a balanced view 
of the whole Marx is necessary. 
 It is this final position that I shall be working towards in the article, via an address 
to the other three. The connecting factor is the need to recognise the significance in 
each approach of the consequences towards our understanding of the place of the 
brain, consciousness, and as such agency. I will go on to argue that in our current 
configuration of capitalism it is over the brain that the struggle is at its most intense 
and where the stakes are highest.  
2. Orthodox Marxism  
The orthodox interpretation, or more pejoratively known as ‘Vulgar Marxism’ is repre-
sented by the writings of, for example, Stalin, Kautsky, and Plekhanov. Orthodox 
Marxism is characterised by Erik Olin Wright as a, “highly deterministic version of 
historical materialism”, in which, “human history was held to follow a well-defined tra-
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jectory of stages, driven by the development of the forces of production (roughly, 
technological capacity) and their interactions with relations of production (roughly, 
real property relations)” (Wright, Levine and Sober 1992, 11).  
The source of much of this interpretation comes from one of the most famous 
statements of Marx, “The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their con-
sciousness” (Marx 1987, 263).  
Such a view is rigidly reproduced by Joseph Stalin and expressed in the text, Dia-
lectical and Historical Materialism, which became the orthodoxy of the 2nd Interna-
tional. Stalin tells us that “Marx’s philosophical materialism holds that the world is by 
its very nature material […] and that the world develops in accordance with the laws 
of movement of matter” (Stalin 1938). Such a narrow interpretation tends towards a 
clockwork version of materialism and of dialectics. Stalin also makes a number of 
inferences from this position regarding consciousness and the brain. He states that 
consciousness is simply an epiphenomenon resulting in a derivative form from the 
brain, as the material substrate of thought, and by inference is fully determined by its 
relation to its material situation: “consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a 
reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in 
its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and 
the brain is the organ of thought” (Ibid.). This position is one that Stalin draws on from 
Lenin, citing Lenin’s claim that “Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best 
an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it” (Ibid.).  
This is a situation in which the mental and spiritual life of a society is entirely sec-
ondary to its material conditions and Stalin is unambiguous in this claim: “Whatever is 
the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, such 
are the ideas, theories political views and political institutions of that society”. By 
placing the brain as coterminous with the base, and the mind as a secondary off-
shoot, akin to an aspect of the superstructure, it renders agency nothing but a sub-
mission of consciousness to the logic of history. This is both a socially, but also sci-
entifically, naïve reading of the capacity of the brain and is in line with a view of the 
worker as utterly subsumed within capital, and in need of salvation by the insights of 
a vanguard with the insight track to history.  
3. Structural Marxism  
Such views are now widely dismissed as overly crude and deterministic. An alterna-
tive approach, that still maintains a commitment to a ‘science’ based approach, is 
characterised as the second position offered above, and can be broadly captured by 
the idea of ‘relative determinism’. Relative determinism states that there is a definite 
determinate course, maintaining a distinction from the ‘voluntarist’ strain of Maoist 
thought, that John Molyneux has characterised as “absolute indeterminism”, and 
which posits “the idea that human beings can do whatever they want without con-
straint” (Molyneux 1995) and which is arguable no Marxism at all, and is also a naïve 
assumption in relation the brain’s plasticity (see Section 6 for more).  
Relative determinism offers a compromise position that there are determining 
conditions, but these do not constitute a fatalistic absolutism. In this scenario a cho-
sen course of action can push towards one or another outcome that is not inevitable. 
Again, Molyneux argues that “If in a given situation a particular desired outcome is 
either probable but not guaranteed or hangs in the balance, then every action taken 
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towards that outcome (provided, of course, it is not counterproductive) increases the 
probability of it occurring and is therefore valuable” (Molyneux 1995).  
Relative determination is broadly the ‘democratic centrist’ or Trotskyist position, in 
which history “hangs in the balance between strongly determined alternatives” (Ibid.) 
and is only marginally variable from the Stalinist position. Crucially it states that “in 
every concrete situation there is a definite limit on what we by our conscious action 
can achieve” (Ibid.). Again, the worker is reduced to a reliance on a cadre gifted with 
the capacity to discern the direction of history, and when the moment is ripe nudge it 
in the right direction. The brain in this scenario is ether seen as a passive aspect of 
fixed capital, or in the cadre becomes a consequentialist calculation machine.  
A more nuanced variation of this position is the idea of determinism in the last in-
stance, wherein there are multiple factors as play in any situation that produces an 
‘overdetermined’ trajectory. Such a view has its roots in the structural Marxism of 
Louis Althusser, and it was adopted and reframed within the tradition of British Cul-
tural Studies precisely as a way of rebalancing and reconceptualising the 
‘base/superstructure’ division.  
Stuart Hall explores the ways in the base/superstructure metaphor needs to be 
re-thought and asks, “can we think this problem in such a way as to retain a key 
premise of historical materialism: the premise of ‘determination in the last instance’ 
by what is sometimes misleading re-referred to as ‘the economic’?” (Hall 1977, 44). 
The important point being the retention of ‘historical materialism’ which comes under 
question when there is a drift towards the position of the “absolute autonomy” of the 
superstructure from base, which the purely voluntarist traditions tends towards. Hall 
argues that “Marx had established that the economy is determinant in the last in-
stance, but that the superstructures had their own ‘affectivity’, which could not be 
simply reduced to the base” (Ibid., 53). Hall is drawn towards Althusser’s structural 
Marxism as a way of accounting for this tension, and while by no means accepting it 
in its entirety but does import the ‘decentring of the subject’. Hall is not without scep-
ticism, but in the end believes, it is an “extremely weak but useful conceptualisation”, 
yet Hall (2016, 110) is “not disposed to give it up”. This implies some autonomy in the 
brain’s capacity to absorb and reframe a situation, but in this still loosely Althusserian 
understanding of subjectivity it is placed in the, again, subordinate structural relation 
to its ideological situation – it’s real conditions of existence being only accessible 
through officially sanctioned means, contrary to current scientific understanding of 
brain plasticity (see Section 6).  
Ellen Meiksins Wood is much less forgiving of Althusser; with the aspects of the 
decentring of the subject being of particular concern, she describes Althusser’s 
achievement as having “redefined the relations between base and superstructure in 
such a way that the vagaries of human agency could be ‘rigorously’ excluded from 
the science of society, insisting on completely ‘structural’ determinations, while at the 
same time allowing for the unpredictable specificity of historical reality” (Meiksins 
Wood 1995, 50). The withering reading is intensified when she makes the point that 
Althusser “did little to shift the terms of Marxist theoretical debate decisively away 
from the terrain established by Stalinist orthodoxy. The base/superstructure model 
retained its mechanical character and its conceptualisation of social structure in 
terms of discrete, discontinuous, externally related ‘factors’, ‘levels’ or ‘instances’” 
(Meiksins Wood 1995, 51).  
With regard to ‘levels’, we find ourselves in familiar territory as to the place of the 
brain. Here the brain is judged as a subsumed element of the base, albeit somewhat 
less directly, through the process of submission to the ideological state apparatuses. 
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Although these are deemed to be relatively autonomous there is almost no scope for 
autonomy within the process of interpellation.  
4. Humanist Marxism  
There is thus one concept, or rather capacity, which all these positons leave out – 
indeed actively undermine – that of will, volition or to use Raymond William’s term, 
‘intention’. Such is the third, humanist oriented, position referred to above. Such an 
orientation is taken by Erich Fromm (2004) or Norman Geras (1983), who insist on 
Marx’s commitment to a human nature that is open, creative and agental. But here I 
would also place, perhaps problematically but unapologetically, Raymond Williams 
(2005). In his essay on base and superstructure, amongst a number of his other writ-
ings, Williams attempts to reinforce the fundamental importance of intention, no 
doubt at risk of accusations of volunteerism. Williams explicitly attempts to recognise 
the base/superstructure relation as neither dissolvable into a completely totalising 
whole, nor divisible into a set of discreet autonomous levels. As such Williams argues 
that, “when we talk of ‘the base’ we are talking of a process and not a state”, mean-
ing that “[w]e have to revalue ‘determination’ towards the setting of limits and the ex-
ertion of pressure” (Williams 2005, 34). As such, he certainly argues against a stark 
distinction of base and superstructure, recognising, with Lukács, that a notion of total-
ity can be “compatible with the notion of social being determining consciousness” 
(Ibid.). But Williams believes that totality can be an empty concept if we just have in-
teracting forces, hence the question of what is determining what becomes overly 
complex and opaque. As such “the key question to ask about any notion of totality in 
cultural theory is this: whether the notion of totality includes the notion of intention” 
(Williams 2005, 36). Williams invokes a rather unclear use of ‘intention’ which echoes 
a somewhat ambiguous use elsewhere in his writing. However, he is clear that inten-
tion is not an individual or simple expression of a choice or rationale, pertaining to a 
specific decision, but rather a social entity. Williams explains that “any society has a 
specific organisation, a specific structure, and that the principles of this organisation 
and structure can be seen as directly related to certain social intentions, intentions by 
which we define the society” (Ibid.). 
A social intention then is an active force that contributes to an understanding of 
the totality of a situation and that, to an extent, determines it. The fact that Williams 
wishes to remain true to a Marxist positon means he is not prepared to grasp such 
intention as arbitrarily arrived at, but always out of a concrete set of circumstances. 
This echoes one of the most frequently cited of Marx’s statements, “Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1979, 103). As such Williams also links 
intention to the idea of hegemony: “Indeed I think that we can properly use the notion 
of totality only when we combine it with that other crucial Marxist concept of ‘hegem-
ony’” (Williams 2005, 37). This is not a surface ideology but a practice which “satu-
rates the society” and which “emphasises the facts of domination” (Ibid.).  
This reminds us of the need to comprehend how such saturation continues to oc-
cur, in order to combat it. As such there is a compelling case for developing the un-
derstanding of intention further, beyond the science that was available to Williams the 
time, and in light of the digital revolution and the continuing intensification of Post-
Fordism.  
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5. Autonomist Marxism  
This idea of the centrality of intention as a determining factor brings us to another 
strand of Marxism, born of the Italian Autonomist movement, and which has been 
operative in reframing Marxism around working class movements as the driving force 
of capitalist development – but taking into account the post-structuralist critiques of 
humanism and shifts in subjectivity associated with the move to Post-Fordism – 
which reflects the fourth position offered above. It also brings us into contact with an-
other of Marx’s important writings that have added to the richness of 
base/superstructure debates and which unambiguously reemphasis the importance 
of Marx for today, that is the so called ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse 
(Marx 1973, 690-712).  
There is a very fruitful resonance between the developments in Autonomous 
Marxism and the humanistic strand of British Cultural Studies mentioned above. This 
is one that offers a way to draw out the significance of Marx for the current social and 
technological configuration of capitalism that emphasises an understanding of the 
brain as a productive and active force, without reverting to an essentialist conception 
of human nature. For the Autonomists Marx’s notion of ‘general intellect’ is of primary 
importance, in that regard it is worth quoting Marx’s in full:  
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, 
self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participa-
tion in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human 
hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital 
indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct 
force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process 
of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and 
been transformed in accordance with it. (Marx 1973, 706) 
There are few more direct indications of the significance of the brain in Marx’s writ-
ings. This certainly cannot be put down to be part of his ‘early’ ‘humanistic’ phase, 
given its estimated authorship is around 1857, at least 12 years after the ‘break’. 
Here it is the human brain and human collective will that are the determinate fea-
tures, of course there could be a temptation here to claim this as direct support for a 
voluntarist conception, and another full reversal of the line of determination, some-
thing that can, according to the key Autonomist thinker Paolo Virno, “hardly be called 
a ‘Marxian’ thesis” (Virno n.d.). However, this would be a naïve position and one 
should read Virno’s point as a somewhat ironic jab at orthodox readings of Marx. In 
fact, Marx is clear in the fragment that the general intellect is no sooner recognised 
than it is subsumed. It is the ever-increasing sophistication of machinery that threat-
ens to absorb the collective skills and knowledge of living labour into fixed capital 
(dead labour), this is a parallel shift from the formal to the real subsumption, that is 
the move from artisanal pre-capitalist labour, parasitically captured by capital, to a 
fully developed factory system.  
Carlo Vercellone (2007, 24), another proponent of the autonomist school, argues: 
“The subsumption of the worker to capital becomes real when it is imposed inside the 
production system and no longer only outside it”. Vercellone stresses that “[t]he com-
pulsion to wage-labour is no longer merely of a monetary nature, but also of a tech-
nological nature, rendered endogenous by technical progress. In such a way, the 
individual labour-power of the producer, increasingly reduced to a simple living ap-
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pendage of the system of machines, ‘now…refuses its services unless it has been 
sold to capital’” (Ibid.). The attempt to render labour as mere appendage is counter-
balanced by shifts in the Fordist era to political democratisation, the welfare state and 
mass education and the tendency towards ‘diffuse intellectuality’ which produced “the 
crisis of the first dimension of real subsumption”, entailing the “incessant struggle of 
wage-labourers for the re-appropriation of knowledges and the emancipation from 
the economic compulsion of wage labour” (Ibid., 25).  
Thus, the shift from the real subsumption to the general intellect is one of a con-
tinuing process of capital’s subsumption of labour, though in this instance it is the 
process of information technology moving to absorb the entirety of human capacity 
that inheres in the human brain. Yet, at the same time, it opens up the possibility for 
labour to reclaim knowledge and to reverse the real subsumption, indeed with the 
possibility at some stage to eliminate subsumption all together. This is because of a 
fundamental backstop in the process of real subsumption, which is precisely that the 
brain cannot be fully absorbed into the machinery nor reproduced within it: “[i]n the 
cognitive-labour-producing knowledge, the result of labour remains incorporated in 
the brain of the worker and is thus inseparable from her person” (Ibid., 33).  
Vercellone, sees this as the logic of the Fragment on Machines, and one that 
foreshadows the challenge to Post-Fordism. Vercellone (2007, 28) reads Marx as 
believing that, “the deepening of the real subsumption can create certain conditions 
favourable to a collective reappropriation of knowledges insofar as ‘living labour’ is 
able to reconvert part of its surplus into free time”. One key aspect to developing this 
challenge towards an emancipatory logic is the condition that this free time be con-
verted into “the education of a diffuse intellectuality” (2007, 29). No wonder education 
has been relentlessly under attack as a public good in the most crisis ridden capitalist 
economies.  
As soon as “[t]he principal ‘fixed capital’ becomes ‘man himself’” (Ibid.) then the 
imperative to capture this is intensified, returning us to the condition of the formal 
subsumption, “in the sense that it is based essentially on the relation of monetary 
dependence of wage-labourer inside the process of circulation” (Ibid., 31). In this 
form of capitalism then, in order to maintain its grip, capital has to act as an external 
force directly on the brain. It can therefore be no surprise that we have increasingly 
become witness to the development of, for example, affective mechanisms aimed 
squarely at the nervous system. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi has explored such practices as 
inducing new kinds of pathological relations to work. He has termed this relation ‘neu-
ro-totalitarianism’ in the context of what he calls ‘the soul at work’. In the book of that 
name Berardi tells us, in line with the broader understanding of cognitive labour, “hi 
tech workers invest their specific competencies, creative, innovative and communica-
tive energies in the labour process; that is, the best part of their intellectual capaci-
ties” (Berardi 2009, 78). However, while such workers are in some senses less alien-
ated and, as we have seen, subsumed by capital, than their industrial predecessors, 
their distance, but at the same time monetary reliance, means that they need to be 
perpetually on call. When workers are called to give, they must give everything and 
as such “Info-workers can be seen as “neuro workers”. They prepare their nervous 
system as an active receiving terminal for as much time as possible” a process that 
Berardi (2009, 90) compares to “the constant stress of a permanent cognitive elec-
trocution”. 
In a generalised condition of cognitive electrocution that spreads out from cogni-
tive labour into the entire social sphere, wherein social activity itself is drawn into this 
process of digital formal subsumption, we live in something akin to a “multilayered 
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dimension of technomaya” wherein “[d]igital technology has given a power to the 
media that is directly acting on the mind, so that the spell of the media-sphere has 
wrapped itself around the psychosphere” (Berardi 2014, 6). The extent of the misery 
caused by this is indicated by the huge increase in mental illness and suicide that 
has occurred in the Post-Fordist era, “in the last 45 years suicide rates have in-
creased by 60% world-wide” and Berardi puts this down to the fact that “An epidemic 
of unhappiness is spreading over the planet” because “[s]emiocapitalism is infiltrating 
the nervous cells of conscious organisms, inoculating them with a thanato-political 
rationale” (Ibid., 13).  
Semiocapitalism includes the drive to capture attention that is typical of the digital 
platforms that have come to dominate digital life since the early 21st century. The 
monetarisation of attention, in terms of both the targeting of adverting but also in the 
user generation of new content, can be seen as something akin to the becoming la-
bour of the social. This expanding condition ensures that the struggle within historical 
materialism is now over the brain itself. For example, Google is referred to by Berardi 
(2014, 14) as “the most refined attention-draining machine” that has now been further 
boosted by the development of the smartphone that is “pervading every moment of 
the day and night”. Berardi concludes by suggesting that this “manipulation of neural 
systems” (Ibid., 25) needs to be understood in light of the neuro-plasticity of the 
brain. The ability of the brain to assimilate and adapt to contextual inputs makes the 
brain the material end point of capital’s attempts to capture it in value creating cir-
cuits, “intervening on the neural system, redirecting neural activity and reshaping 
synaptic pathways” (Ibid.).  
6. Conclusion: Plasticity and Determination in the Last Instance  
The moulding of the plastic brain has always been the focus of capitalism, but it has 
gone from being a derivative to a primary aim in the shift to post-Fordism, as Marx 
himself pre-empts in the Fragment on Machines. In this configuration Berardi (2014, 
25) does offer some cause for hope, surmising that the neuro-plastic aspects of the 
brain “invites a process of sabotage and subversion of the dominant modes of mental 
wiring”. Although Berardi’s references to neuro-plasticity are fleeting there is nothing 
here that is unreasonable. 
In essence neuroplasticity means the brain is significantly moulded by its envi-
ronment and is perpetually affected and adapted to its context, “The adult brain is not 
only capable of changing, but it does so continuously throughout life” (Constandi 
2016, 4). But the brain is not changing passively, it is always actively filtering, model-
ling, reworking, and feeding back on itself. As the leading scholar in the humanities 
and social sciences on this topic, Catherine Malabou (2008, 13), demands regarding 
the plastic brain: “securing a true plasticity means insisting on knowing what it can do 
and not simply what it can tolerate”. This is supported by the brain’s ‘modulational’ 
capacity which means plasticity adds to it, “the functions of artist and instructor in 
freedom and autonomy to its role as sculptor”, brains don’t just receive information 
but, “have the power to form or to reform this very information” (Ibid., 24).  
The need for a consciousness of plasticity to be harnessed, collectively, to reflex-
ively take back control of the brain’s own volitions, is the pivot point of the contempo-
rary struggle against capital. Harnessing must also take account of the leaps forward 
in understanding pre-conscious affective aspects of the brain, but nevertheless here 
we can propose the brain as operating as the source of determination in the last in-
stance – not merely another aspect of overdetermination – as would be the conclu-
sion from earlier representations of the base/superstructure or determinism/agency 
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question. These earlier incarnations may be appropriate to their times, and to their 
contemporary understandings of the brain, but we are now in a positon to again re-
fresh Marx in light of changes to capitalism, and also the emerging insights of neuro-
science.  
To recognise the brain as determining in the last instance is not to take a pure 
voluntarist position, but to understand that the brain is under the immense pressures 
of neuro-totalitarianism inherent in the Post-Fordist economy and embedded in the 
dialectic of historical materialism, but also with the power to adapt, to rework and to 
reinvent. The prevailing condition is one in which the brain’s modulational capacity is 
habitually concealed, repressed and nominally diverted to tasks not best served to its 
own thriving – but in the end it is the brain itself which is the substrata that supports 
the rest of the mechanism of capital.  
Malabou (2008, 1) makes a direct analogy of brain plasticity to Marx and historical 
materialism, telling us: “Humans make their own brain, but they do not know that they 
make it”. So it is we still can talk of historical materialism to the extent that the brain 
has become caught in a dialectic with the machinery of fixed capital. As Malabou tells 
us “to talk about the plasticity of the brain means to see in it not only the creator and 
receiver of form but also an agency of disobedience to every constituted form, a re-
fusal to submit to a model” (Ibid., 6). For Malabou, the imperative is for us to gain 
consciousness of this plasticity, of its capacity. In doing so we should make sure we 
are not merely submitted to the logic of capital, in particular the kind of digital, flexible 
networked capitalism discussed above, so she asks, “What should we do so that 
consciousness of the brain does not purely and simply coincide with the spirit of capi-
talism?” (Ibid., 12). Therefore, the struggle is to gain control of consciousness, in that 
sense the task is as it ever was – but is now more immanent than ever given the 
brain’s foundational importance for capital.  
Berardi (2014, 27) talks about the need to “disentangle the autonomy of the gen-
eral intellect from its neuro-totalitarian jail”. This seems to me like the best call to 
arms for a Marxism of the 21st century and a suitable renewal of the project that was 
born with Marx himself 200 years ago – so to answer my earlier question, we must 
marshal our collective brains to bring about change, but this must instigate a change 
in the mode and relation of production that is currently parasitic on the brain, or ulti-
mately it will be a superficial and fruitless enterprise.  
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